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Transboundary Renewable Resource Management and Conservation Motives 
I. Introduction 
Although the issue of the optimal management of jointly-exploited renewable resources, 
such as many transboundary fish stocks, is not necessarily new, it is certainly current given the 
recent conflicts between Canada and the European Union over turbot and between Canada and 
the United States over Pacific salmon, as well as the seemingly endless conflict in the North 
Atlantic fishery over cod. If countries were identical in every way, this management would likely 
be trivial as all countries would ideally agree on the optimal steady state biomass level, and thus 
agree on harvest shares and on the optimal annual harvest of the stock. Conflicts arise, however, 
when there are differences between countries. In previous studies, such as Munro (1979), these 
differences have centred around divergences in perceptions of the social discount rate and in 
harvesting costs across countries. Discount rates have typically been employed to compare 
differences in countries' views on conservation, as low discount rates imply a greater emphasis 
on future returns, so that countries with such rates would prefer to harvest more in the future than 
higher discount rate countries and would therefore be more "conservationist." While this view 
may in part describe this motivation, clearly other social, political and moral reasons for 
conservation exist, and it is this issue which is addressed in this paper. Observation suggests that 
some countries are interested in conservation of fish stocks for reasons other than future profit, 
and frequently, the countries which are more conservative have some vested interest in 
conservation of a particular fish stock itself, as in the case where a country has a significant 
domestic industry which is dependent on that fish stock.  Often, the more conservationist country 
borders on the resource and may have a fishing fleet suitable for fishing close to home but 
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unsuitable for global harvesting, so that the survival of the fish stock is vital to the industry. A 
foreign country fishing armada usually has alternative fishing possibilities so that depletion of a 
particular stock is of less consequence, and therefore may have an incentive to ignore the 
conservation of the resource and move on to other areas. In this paper, we model a duopolistic 
situation in which one country, denoted the home country, has a "conservation motive," 
preferring a higher stock independently of the level of the harvest, and another country, the 
foreign country, which has no such motive, and thus is simply concerned with a discounted flow 
of profits derived from the harvest.  Countries are assumed to contemplate a cooperative 
agreement, as it is generally accepted that cooperation is more desirable with respect to both 
conservation (higher steady state stock levels) and social welfare of all parties.1  This study is 
focussed on the optimal steady state fish stock level, and hence on the steady state total allowable 
harvest (TAC), and not on how such a harvest is divided.2   The economics of the sharing of this 
total harvest requires the relatively straight-forward application of Nash bargaining concept. 
However, such an analysis would require the specification of "threat points" or non-cooperative 
payoffs. For examples of optimal sharing rules, see Vislie (1987) which provides a dynamically-
consistent (self-enforcing) agreement assuming that the payoffs in the absence of a cooperative 
settlement are equal, or Ferrara and Missios (1995) which finds the optimal dynamically-
                                                          
     1Levhari and Mirman (1980) show this in a non-cooperative model where the two countries act as Cournot duopolists. 
Plourde and Yeung (1989) find that this result also applies to situations in which there are more than two countries 
competing for the same stock. 
     2 The division of the harvest can be assumed to be determined prior to the negotiation of the TAC. 
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consistent sharing rule accounting for potential differences in non-cooperative payoffs through an 
extension of Vislie's model. Dynamically-consistent solutions such as these are preferable to 
"binding contract" models of Munro's type, which require perfect enforcement of quotas whereas 
in reality this may be impossible or excessively costly. In the following sections, the impacts of 
the harvest sharing rule as well as differences in the discount rates on the steady state fish stock 
are analyzed and briefly compared to two current conflicts - the Canada-EU turbot and Canada-
US salmon disputes - in an attempt to explain the practices observed in allowable catch trends 
and make predictions regarding future agreements. 
 
II. The Model 
As in Munro (1979), we consider two countries facing a world demand for harvested fish that is 
infinitely elastic, implying a parametric price, p.  In each period t, the two countries bargain over 
the division of their combined harvest, ht, with  as the share of country one (the home 
country) and (1-) as the share of country two (the foreign country), where 01.  This 
is in contrast to Munros model in which countries bargain over the weight given to their 
objective functional in the joint maximization problem, and not over harvest shares.  From the 
observation of such international fishery management coalitions such as the North Atlantic 
Fishery Organization (NAFO), it appears more likely that countries in fact bargain over shares of 
the total allowable catch.  For the same reason, in our model the two countries negotiate a 
binding agreement (as in Munro). Let xt be the fish biomass at time t, so that the change in the 
fish stock is the natural growth function, F(x), less the total harvest: 
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From here forward, we will ignore time subscripts except when their inclusion is informative. 
 
For convenience of exposition, we will assume that the biological growth function can be 
expressed as the Schaeffer-Lotka variation 
For simplicity we also assume that the countries both have a constant average cost of extraction 
equal to c. Finally, let the instantaneous social discount rates for the home and foreign countries 
be 1 and 2, respectively. 
The home country receives instantaneous social benefits from both the harvest and the 
level of the fish stock, so that its objective functional is: 
where U2=U/x0. If U2>0 then the home country has the above mentioned conservation 
motive, deriving utility from the level of the fish stock, but if U2=0 then there is no such motive.  
 The foreign country's objective functional is the discounted net profit from its share of the 
harvest: 
t t tx = F( x )-h .  
F(x)= x - x .2   
0
- t
t t
1e U(h ,x )dt,

    
 
 
page...5 
The problem is then to maximize the sum of the objective functionals 
 
subject to the constraints 
 and, 
where hMAX is the maximum possible harvest in any period, determined by physical catch 
constraints. 
This maximization can be constructed as an optimal control problem with the control 
variable ht, the state variable xt and the co-state variable q: 
0
infinity
- t
t(1- )e [p - c] h dt.2    
    U(h,x)e dt +(1- ) [p -c]h e dt- t - t1 2  
x = x - x -h,2   
tx 0,  
0 h h ,t  MAX  
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which can be transformed into the present value Hamiltonian, 
where =2-1. Application of the Maximum Principle yields the optimality conditions, 
 
 
 
and the transversality condition, 
 
 
In the steady state, q=x=0, so the steady state fish stock is found to be 
Using the first optimality condition for q and substituting into the second condition, this steady 
state can be rewritten as 
= U(h,x)e +(1- )[p -c]h e +q e ( x - x -h)- t - t - t 21 2 1        
H = e = U(h,x)+(1- )[p -c]h e +q( x - x -h)1t - t 2       


  
H
h
= U (h,x)+(1- )[p - c] e - q = 0,1
- t  
q = q - [ U +q -2 qx]1 2     
T infinity
T
- T(q x e )= 0.1

 lim   
~x =
-
2
+
U (h,x)
2 q
.
1 2 



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Notice, that if U2=0, the steady state stock level is independent of the harvest shares given that 
the growth parameters  and , as well as the discount factor 1, are constants.  Thus, in the 
situation where the home country has no conservation motive and therefore acts in the manner of 
the foreign country, the steady state fish stock is independent of the division of the harvest, as 
found by Munro.3  However, when there does exist a conservation motive in the management 
preferences of the home country (U2 is not zero), this independence does not exist, as can be 
shown through the derivative with respect to the harvest share : 
 
 
which simplifies to 
 
 
 
which is positive as long as U2 is positive.  This result implies that in the presence of a 
conservation motive for one country, the steady state biomass level is higher when the harvest 
                                                          
     3Even if there is no conservation motive for the home country, the Munro result of a bang-bang solution will be 
replicated here only if the utility function of the home country is linear in h. 
~
~ ~
x =
-
2
+
U (h ,x)
2 [ U +(1- )[p - c] e ]
.
1 2
1
- t
 


   
 


    
  
 

~x
=
U [2 U +2 (1- )[p - c] e ] - U [2 (U - [p - c] e ]
[2 ( U +(1- )[p - c] e ) ]
,
2 1
- t
2 1
- t
1
- t 2
 

   


~x
=
U [p - c] e
2 [ U +(1- )[p - c] e ]
,
2
- t
1
- t 2
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share of that country increases, a finding which is intuitively appealing.4 
 
III. Impact of Differences in Discount Factors 
A higher discount factor and thus more emphasis on future returns, as mentioned previously, has 
been employed to differentiate between more and less conservative countries.  While it is 
true that a higher discount factor does implicitly indicates a desire to receive a lower harvest 
today in return for a larger harvest in the future, we have shown that other more benevolent 
motives for conservation can result in a higher fish stock than without such motives 
independently of differences in discount factors.  In other words, the steady state stock will be 
higher if one country has a conservation motive even if the discount factors, or equivalently 
discount rates, of the home and foreign countries are identical (that is, even if =0).  Despite 
this fact, it is necessary to examine the case in which the differences exist between the discount 
factor of the home and that of the foreign country, as it is quite unlikely that all countries have 
                                                          
     4This analysis can be extended to a "Home-Home" model where both countries have a conservation motive. The joint 
maximization problem would become 
   1 t 2 tU (h,x)e dt + (1 )U (h,x)e dt,1 2  
subject to the above constraints, where Ui is the social benefit function of country i. In this case, the steady state stock 
level, from the optimality conditions, would be 
 
~x =
2
+
U +(1 )U e
U +(1 )U e
.
1 2
1
2
2 t
1
1
1
2 t


 
 




 
Notice, if the two countries were to have the same social benefit functions and discount rates (i.e., the two countries were 
identical), the steady state would be independent of , as would be expected. 
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identical valuations regarding future harvests or views on risk or uncertainty.  We find that the 
steady state fish stock is increasing in , since =2-1 and 
and 
So, as the difference between the discount factors of the foreign country and the home country 
becomes larger, the steady state stock becomes larger, and consequently, the combined harvest of 
the two countries becomes smaller.  This is analogous to saying that increases in the discount 
factor of the home country holding the discount factor of the foreign country constant, or 
decreases in the discount factor of the foreign country holding the discount factor of the home 
country constant,  result in a lower steady state fish stock, a less conservative outcome.  This at 
first seems counter-intuitive: if we compare the case where the more conservative (home) 
countrys discount factor is larger than that of the less conservative foreign country to when the 
two factors are equal, we find that despite the fact the more conservative country becomes even 
more conservationist, a less conservative outcome ensues.  However, this one country 
only perspective is deceiving.  In the above scenario, it is true that the country with the 
conservation motive becomes even more conservative, the foreign country is relatively less 
conservative, and therefore there is an even greater conflict between the management preferences 


~ ~ ~
~ ~
x
=
1
2
U (h ,x)t[(1 )(pc)] e
2 [ U (h ,x)+(1 )(pc)e ]
< 0
1
2
t
1
t 2 
 
  


 

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~ ~ ~
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  
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of the two countries, and it appears that this conflict is the source of the lower steady state.  This 
may be more easily seen in the opposite case in which the discount factor of the foreign country 
rises relative to the home countrys discount factor, which leads to a higher steady state stock 
level.  Here, both countries desire some level of conservation, but for different reasons: the 
foreign country wants conservation of the stock because it is more future-oriented and greater 
conservation today implies larger harvests in the future, and the home country seeks conservation 
simply because it prefers more of the resource for social or political reasons as well as for future 
harvests.  
 
IV. A Brief Application to the Current Turbot and Salmon Disputes 
In early 1995, a fish war which gained much attention erupted between the European 
Union and Canada over a member of the flounder family called turbot.  The dispute occurred in 
an area off the coast of Canada (but outside the 200-nautical mile limit) known as the nose 
and tail of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, where European vessels, primarily Spanish 
and Portuguese, fished well above the quota set by the 15-country NAFO for the European 
Union.  In 1995, the European Union received a quota of 3,400 tonnes, 12.6 percent of the 
27,000 total allowable catch.  Canada and the European Union finally reached an agreement that 
was extended to cover all of the 15 members of NAFO, in which the total allowable catch was 
set at 20,000 tonnes with Canada receiving a share of 15 percent (down from 60 percent) and the 
European Union receiving a share of 55 percent.  The total allowable catch has been falling 
steadily, from over one hundred thousand tonnes in 1989 to just twenty thousand tonnes in 1996, 
a detail which parallels the significant decline of turbot stocks in recent years to dangerous 
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levels.5 In light of the falling turbot stocks from overfishing above the set international quotas, 
Canada likely has an incentive to conserve turbot stocks (or a conservation motive for the 
home country), particularly as turbot has gained a substantial importance to the Canadian 
Atlantic fishery given the recent devastation of cod and other north Atlantic stocks.  Further, until 
1996, Canada has received a share of the total allowable catches above sixty percent (in our 
model, a share  higher than one half).  Using these two facts, our model predicts a high steady 
state fish stock, and combined with the recent overfishing, suggests that the total allowable catch 
should be low relative to the 1980s when the conservation of turbot stocks was of a much lesser 
concern, and so is consistent with the above mentioned observed fall in total allowable catches in 
the 1990s.  However, this may be partially offset by the fact that the European Union may be 
more present-oriented (i.e. may have a lower discount factor) relative to Canada, which has 
markedly lower interest rates than in Europe.6 
While it may be reasonable to accept that Canada and the European Union have different 
views on the conservation of stocks off the Canadian coast, it is not so easy to accept for the 
Pacific salmon dispute between Canada and the United States. The present salmon conflict, 
which began over a century ago and recurringly flares up from time to time, contains elements 
which suggest that both countries have a significant interest in the long-term viability of the 
                                                          
     5Estimates of the stock size of turbot vary substantially, but most would be consistent with the view that turbot are in 
danger of extinction if the overfishing that occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s is to continue.  
     6For example, annual government treasury bill rates, in the period from 1985 to 1994, ranged from 4.84% to 12.81% 
in Canada but ranged from 8.03% to 14.17% in Spain (and were on average 2.3 percent higher in Spain).  Source: IMF 
International Financial Statistics (CD-ROM). 
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Pacific salmon fishery. Of the four major Pacific salmon species, pinks and sockeye mainly 
spawn in the Canadian rivers of British Columbia (particularly the Fraser River), and cohos and 
chinooks mainly spawn in the American Rivers of Washington and Oregon (especially the 
Columbia River). The dispute arises from American catches of fish spawned in Canada as they 
pass through American waters and from Canadian catches of fish spawned in the United States as 
they pass through Canadian waters. Sockeye and chinooks are the most valuable species of the 
above four, the first to Canada and the second to the United States. As an obvious result, both 
sides should be concerned with the conservation of the salmon fishery. In this case, the variation 
of the model where both countries have a conservation motive must be used, and accordingly, it 
is expected that the agreement reached between Canada and the United States would include a 
low total allowable catch.7 Given the past overfishing by fishermen of both countries in the past 
despite various treaties meant to prevent such occurrences, the sharing rule should be of the self-
enforcing type of Vislie, or Ferrara and Missios. 
 
Conclusion 
A simple theoretical model of transboundary fishing conflicts in which one country has 
an a priori incentive to conserve was presented to analyze the effect of such a conservation 
motive on the steady state fish stock, as well as to examine how this stock is affected by the 
sharing rule negotiated between two countries.  In contrast to previous studies, this paper has 
investigated the determination of the total allowable catch through the use of the steady state, and 
                                                          
     7Traditional legal rights of the Native peoples of both the United States and Canada will complicate this issue. 
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not the division of a given harvest. 
The presence of a conservation motive serves to increase the steady state fish stock level, 
as do increases in the negotiated share of the country with such a motive.  The model does 
possess some predicative power, being consistent with the observation of the recent decline in 
total allowable catches of turbot set by NAFO in the dispute between Canada and the European 
Union, and being useful in deducing the justification of such actions.  Despite its simplicity, the 
model presented here adds necessary reality to previous models of jointly-exploited fish stocks, 
and can easily be extended beyond fishery management to that of other transboundary renewable 
natural resources. 
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 Abstract: 
A simple two-country theoretical model of transboundary fishing conflicts in which one country 
has an incentive to conserve the fish stock in addition to being profit-maximizing is presented to 
examine the effect of such a conservation motive on the stock level in the steady state and to 
analyze how this stock level is affected by the division of the harvest. A formal model is utilized 
to show that a conservation motive of one or both countries serves to increase the stock level and 
that this level is increasing in the harvest share of the country with the motive. A brief 
application to the Canada-European Union turbot and Canada-United States salmon disputes 
suggests consistency between the model and reality. 
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